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Stopping prepared but no longer relevant responses is a simple act of cognitive control that 
supports flexible and goal‐directed behaviour. In the past two decades, response inhibition 
has received much attention across research domains. Cognitive psychologists and neurosci-
entists have explored the cognitive and neural mechanisms of response inhibition, develop-
mental scientists have studied the ‘rise and fall’ of inhibitory control capacities across the life 
span, and clinical researchers have examined correlations between individual differences in 
response inhibition and behaviours such as substance abuse, overeating, and risk taking. 
In this chapter, we provide a selective review of recent behavioural and computational work 
on response inhibition (for a review of the neuroscience literature, see Chapter  16 by 
Forstmann & Alkemade in this volume).
In the response‐inhibition literature, individual or group differences are often attributed to 
variation in the effectiveness of a single inhibitory control function. But many processes 
 contribute to stopping an action. Response inhibition requires an interplay between three 
basic and computationally well‐defined ‘reactive’ processes (signal detection, action selection, 
and suppression of motor output), which are regulated and influenced by sets of processes 
that take place on different timescales: outcome monitoring, advance preparation, rule acqui-
sition and maintenance, associative learning, and development (Verbruggen, McLaren, & 
Chambers, 2014). Here we will discuss mainly ‘reactive’, ‘proactive’, and ‘associatively medi-
ated’ forms of inhibitory control (for a review of key developmental transitions, see Munakata, 
Snyder, & Chatham, 2012).
How to Stop a Response
Reactive inhibitory control in response to changes in the environment or internal state is 
often studied in tasks such as the go/no‐go task (Donders, 1868/1969) and the stop‐signal 
task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Vince, 1948). In the go/no‐go task, 
subjects are instructed to respond when a go stimulus appears (e.g., an ‘O’), but to withhold 
their response when a no‐go stimulus appears (e.g., an ‘X’). In the stop‐signal task, subjects 
perform a primary go task, such as responding to the identity of a stimulus (e.g., press left 
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when an ‘O’ appears, and right when an ‘X’ appears). On a minority of the trials, an extra 
visual or auditory signal appears after a variable stop‐signal delay (SSD), instructing subjects 
to withhold the planned go response.
We will focus on the stop‐signal paradigm because it allows researchers to estimate the 
covert latency of response inhibition: the stop‐signal reaction time (SSRT). SSRT has become 
an established marker for reactive inhibitory control (Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 
2013), and many studies have used the stop‐signal paradigm to develop detailed accounts of 
the cognitive processes underlying reactive inhibitory control and to examine what factors 
influence them.
The Race Between Going and Stopping
Since the 1980s, virtually all stop‐signal research relied on a mathematical model because 
SSRT is unobservable without it. The model is the Logan and Cowan (1984) independent 
race model, which describes response inhibition as a race between a go process, triggered by 
the presentation of a go stimulus, and a stop process, triggered by the presentation of the stop 
signal. When the stop process finishes before the go process, response inhibition is successful, 
and no response is emitted (signal‐inhibit trial); when the go process finishes before the stop 
process, response inhibition is unsuccessful, and the response is incorrectly emitted (signal‐
respond trial). The independent race model mathematically relates signal‐respond reaction 
time (RT), no‐stop‐signal RT, and inhibition functions and provides several methods for 
estimating SSRT. Logan and Cowan wrote it as a race between generic finishing time 
distributions without specifying the processes that gave rise to the finishing times. This gen-
erality is a virtue because it allows the model to be applied to any subject population (including 
people, monkeys, and rats), effector (hands, eyes, feet), or experimental condition (for a 
review of models, see Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c). This generality is also a limitation: the 
model does not specify the underlying processes, so it can only describe and not explain reac-
tive control. Fortunately, several models of the processes underlying the stop-signal task have 
appeared in the literature to address these issues.
General and  Special Race Models Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, and Wagenmakers 
(2014) extended the independent race model to include choice in the go process and the 
potential for choice in the stop process. They proposed a general race model that assumed 
choice was implemented as a race between the alternative responses, assuming one runner 
for each alternative response in the go task and one runner for the stop process. They 
 proposed special race models in which the runners were characterised as specific stochastic 
accumulators. The best‐fitting model represented each runner as a ‘diffusion’ to a single 
bound, characterised by three main parameters: non‐decision time, the rate of stochastic 
accumulation, and the threshold on the accumulator. The first runner to reach its threshold 
determined the outcome of the trial. If it was a go response, then the response was executed. 
On no‐stop‐signal trials, it could be correct or erroneous. If the trial was a stop‐signal trial 
(so there was a stop runner in the race), then the winning go response produced a signal‐
respond trial. If the trial was a stop‐signal trial and the stop runner reached threshold first, 
the winning stop response produced a signal‐inhibit trial. The general and special race 
models make stronger commitments to underlying processes than the original independent 
race model. Their assumptions may be controversial and may be falsified (Ratcliff & Smith, 
2004; Teodorescu & Usher, 2013), but all specific assumptions are controversial, and falsi-
fiability is a virtue. Importantly, the stronger commitments to underlying processes allow 
stronger inferences. For example, they allowed Logan et al. (2014) to test hypotheses about 
capacity sharing between stopping and going.
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Research on dual tasks indicates that central processing capacity is limited, resulting in a 
performance decrement when stimuli for the two tasks appear close together in time (i.e., at 
the equivalent of short SSDs; Pashler, 1994). Stop and go processes do not seem to share 
capacity in this way (e.g., Logan, 1981; Logan & Burkell, 1986; Verbruggen, Schneider, & 
Logan, 2008). Yamaguchi, Logan, and Bissett (2012) measured SSRT in a dual‐task 
experiment in which subjects had to stop one of two go tasks. They found that SSRT was 
unaffected by the temporal overlap of the two tasks and no different in single‐ and dual‐task 
conditions. Logan et al. (2014) tested capacity sharing more rigorously by using the diffusion 
race model. They identified capacity limitations with processing rates in the stochastic accu-
mulators, distinguishing between fixed capacity, in which the rate parameters for all the run-
ners in the race sum to a constant, and unlimited capacity, in which the rate parameters for 
the different runners are unconstrained and independent (Bundesen, 1990; Townsend & 
Ashby, 1983). They tested these hypotheses about processing rates in a stop‐signal experiment 
that manipulated the number of choice alternatives (2, 4, or 6) in the go task. They found 
evidence of strong capacity limitations in the go process: adding more go runners to the race 
slowed the rate at which each runner accumulated evidence. But they found no evidence of 
capacity sharing between the go process and the stop process: the rate of accumulation in the 
stop process was the same no matter how many choice alternatives there were in the go task. 
This converges on more qualitative analyses in previous research on simple stopping (Logan, 
1981; Logan & Burkell, 1986; Yamaguchi et al., 2012) and contrasts with recent findings in 
selective stopping (reviewed below).
It is important to note that this conclusion could not be reached by applying the Logan 
and Cowan (1984) race model. The conclusion is based on changes in the parameters of the 
stochastic accumulators in the special race models. Below we present another application of 
the special race model. Thus, the additional complexity and stronger commitment to mech-
anism produces stronger conclusions.
Interactive Race Models and Their Alternatives The turn of the century marked a substantial 
increase in interest in the neural mechanisms that underlie response inhibition. The Logan 
and Cowan (1984) race model has been useful in this pursuit, but its failure to specify the 
underlying computational mechanisms limits its ability to specify the underlying neural 
 mechanisms. Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, and Schall (2007) developed the interactive race 
model, which explained what happened at the end of the race when the stop process won. 
They modelled the go process as a single diffusion to a threshold and modelled the stop pro-
cess as a unit that inhibited the growth of go activation after an afferent delay following a stop 
signal. They made strong linking propositions that identified the go process with movement‐
related neurons and the stop process with fixation neurons in frontal eye fields, which control 
eye movements. The model accounted for behaviour as well as a version of the independent 
race model but in addition, accounted for firing rates recorded from movement and fixation 
neurons in monkeys performing a countermanding task (i.e., the saccadic version of the 
stop‐signal task). Movement neuron activity is at baseline at the beginning of a trial and rises 
to a threshold value 10–20 ms before an eye movement occurs. On trials in which stopping 
is successful, the activity rises towards a threshold following the same trajectory as on no‐
stop‐signal trials, and then falls abruptly before reaching the threshold. The transition from 
rising to falling coincides with SSRT measured from the monkeys’ behaviour, as if some kind 
of change happens just before SSRT to drive down go activation and inhibit the response. 
Boucher et al. (2007) identified the change as inhibition from fixation neurons projected 
onto the movement neurons.
Logan, Yamaguchi, Schall, and Palmeri (2015) challenged the linking proposition 
connecting the mechanism of stopping to fixation neurons in frontal eye fields by 
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 investigating a blocked input model that inhibits responses by blocking the input that drives 
them. Like Boucher et al. (2007), they implemented the go process as a single diffusion to a 
threshold, but unlike Boucher et al., they assumed that the stop process sets the growth rate 
for the go process to zero, removing the ‘drive’ that causes the rise to a threshold. They 
showed that this model accounted for behaviour as well as the interactive race model but fit 
the neural data better. Specifically, the interactive race model required very strong inhibition 
from stop (fixation) units to go (movement) units, and that strong inhibition produced much 
steeper decay in movement unit activation after SSRT than what was observed in the neurons. 
Logan et al. extended both models to account for steady‐state fixation activity, constraining 
the activity of fixation neurons in the fixation period at the beginning of the trial. This 
improved the neural predictions of the interactive race model, but worsened behavioural pre-
dictions. The blocked input model fit the neural data just as well but fit the behavioural data 
better. Logan et al. also considered a boosted fixation model, which multiplied the activity in 
the fixation unit to stop responses and found that it fit the behavioural data as well as the 
blocked input model, though it predicted steady‐state fixation activity following stop trials 
that was 3 to15 times as high as steady‐state fixation activity before stop trials. On balance, 
the blocked input model did better than interactive race or boosted fixation. Nevertheless, it 
is possible that responses can be inhibited either by blocking the input or by inhibiting the 
growth of activation in movement neurons.
Cortical‐Basal Ganglia Model Imaging, lesion, and animal studies indicate that response 
inhibition relies on an extensive cortico‐basal‐ganglia network (see Chapter  16 by 
Forstmann & Alkemade in this volume). Wiecki and Frank (2013) proposed a computa-
tional model that instantiates this network, extending Frank’s (2006) basal ganglia model 
to include cortical structures involved in response inhibition (see also Chapter  21 by 
Bhandari, Badre, & Frank in this volume). On go trials, saccadic responses are generated 
via the frontal eye fields and superior colliculus. On stop‐signal trials, responses are inhib-
ited via the ‘hyperdirect’ pathway: via the right inferior frontal gyrus and the subthalamic 
nucleus, to the substantia nigra pars reticulata, which then inhibits the superior colliculus. 
Responses are successfully stopped if the hyperdirect pathway inhibits the superior collicu-
lus before it reaches the threshold at which it releases a response. This model correctly 
predicts neural dynamics in key structures during stop‐signal tasks, correctly predicts 
behaviour, and correctly predicts the effects of lesions and drugs.
The Wiecki and Frank (2013) model is an important advance because it provides a platform 
for evaluating hypotheses about interactions between brain structures in response inhibition 
and other tasks that is strongly constrained by physiology, behaviour, and computation. 
However, the model is complex (it has to capture the interactions between the many neural 
structures) and difficult to evaluate by standard model fitting techniques from mathematical 
psychology. Ratcliff and Frank (2012) fit the diffusion model to the output of the basal gan-
glia model, showing how diffusion model parameters relate to activation of structures in the 
basal ganglia model. It would be interesting to fit the Logan et al. (2014) special race model 
to the output of the Wiecki and Frank (2013) model to relate its parameters to activation of 
its structures in stop‐signal tasks.
Stopping Revisited? The first step in successfully stopping a response is nearly always detect-
ing the stop signal (e.g., a traffic light turning red; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). The 
contribution of non‐inhibitory processes is still largely neglected in the ‘reactive’ inhibitory 
control literature, even though computational work indicates that most of SSRT is occupied 
by afferent processes (Boucher et al., 2007; Logan et al., 2014, 2015; Salinas & Stanford, 
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2013), as  indicated in several behavioural studies (e.g., Cavina‐Pratesi, Bricolo, Prior, & Marzi, 
2001; van den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004; Verbruggen, Stevens, & Chambers, 
2014). For example, perceptual distractors substantially prolong SSRTs in a visual stop‐signal 
task, especially when the visual stop signals occurred in the periphery (Verbruggen, Stevens, 
et al., 2014). Other studies have shown that stopping deficits in certain clinical populations 
could be due to impairments in signal detection rather than in inhibition per se (e.g., Bekker 
et al., 2005). Thus, a failure to detect the signal quickly can have important consequences and 
lead to ‘stopping’ deficits.
More generally, the studies discussed in this and previous sections highlight the importance 
of focusing on the underlying processes, such as signal detection, rather than general and 
unitary control functions. They also have important consequences for the interpretation of 
the SSRT. SSRT describes the chain of processes involved in an act of control that results in 
a response being withheld (Logan et  al., 2014; Verbruggen, McLaren, et  al., 2014; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). It includes the duration of perceptual, decisional, and (inhibi-
tory) motor‐related processes. Thus, in simple stop‐signal tasks and their many variants, 
SSRT reflects more than the duration of a single neural inhibitory process, and researchers 
should consider at which processing stages differences between groups or conditions arise 
(see Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014).
Are Stopping and Going Really Independent?
Beginning with Logan and Cowan (1984), models of response inhibition have always 
assumed that stopping and going are independent, at least for most of their durations. 
The models are based on two assumptions about independence: stochastic independence 
and context independence. Stochastic independence requires that the finishing times of the 
stop and go process on a given trial are uncorrelated (i.e., P(stop < t and go < t) = P(stop 
< t  ) × P(go < t)). This assumption simplifies the mathematics of the race considerably. 
Context independence assumes that the stop process is unaffected by the presence of the 
go process, and vice versa. This assumption allows go RT on no‐stop‐signal trials to be used 
as an estimate of go RTs on stop‐signal trials, to predict signal‐respond RTs and calculate 
SSRT. If context independence is violated, then estimates of SSRT are invalid. Thus, the 
assumptions should not be taken lightly. Recently, two lines of evidence have challenged 
the context independence assumption. One addresses selective versions of the stop signal 
task (Bissett & Logan, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2015), and one addresses short SSDs 
in all stop tasks (Bissett, 2014).
Selective Stopping Most stop-signal tasks involve ‘simple’ stopping: there is only one stop 
signal and only one response to it, namely, stopping the ongoing response. In selective stop-
ping tasks, subjects perform some kind of discrimination before deciding whether to stop. In 
stimulus selective stopping tasks, the go task is accompanied by a stop signal or an ignore 
signal; these signals are usually in the same modality but differ along one or more stimulus 
dimensions. Subjects are instructed to stop the go response when the stop signal occurs and 
to continue the go response when the ignore signal occurs (e.g., Bissett & Logan, 2014). In 
motor selective stopping tasks, there is one stop signal, and subjects are instructed to stop one 
response (e.g., the left hand) but not the other (e.g., the right hand) when the stop signal 
occurs (e.g., De Jong, Coles, & Logan, 1995). In conditional motor selective stopping tasks, 
subjects make two concurrent responses to the go tasks, for example, pressing keys with the 
index fingers in response to one go stimulus and pressing keys with the middle fingers in 
response to another go stimulus. The stop signal instructs subjects to stop one of the two 
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responses (e.g., the left hand response) but continue with the other (e.g., the right hand 
response) when a stop signal occurs (e.g., Aron & Verbruggen, 2008).
Subjects succeed at stopping ‘selectively’ in all of these tasks, but their success comes 
with a cost: signal‐respond RT is often longer than no‐stop‐signal RT, and RT for the 
responses that are not supposed to be inhibited is longer than no‐stop‐signal RT in most 
experiments (for a review and a re‐analysis of published data, see Bissett & Logan, 2014). 
The longer signal‐respond RTs indicate violations of context independence, which inval-
idates conclusions based on the application of the independent race model to the data 
and challenges the common assumption that selective stopping increases the complexity 
of the stop process without affecting the go process (e.g., van de Laar, van den Wildenberg, 
van Boxtel, & van der Molen, 2010). The longer RTs on ignore trials suggest that going 
and stopping share processing capacity (Bissett & Logan, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2015); in some cases, subjects may even stop all responses completely first and then 
restart them if the trial requires it. This challenges the use of the ignore signal in selective 
stopping tasks as a control for the requirements to attend to the stop signal (e.g., Sharp 
et al., 2010).
Verbruggen and Logan (2015) tested the hypothesis that the go and stop processes share 
capacity in selective stopping tasks by manipulating the consistency of mapping between 
signals and the requirement to stop or ignore in response to the signal. In consistent map-
ping conditions, each signal played the same role throughout the experiment; in varied 
mapping conditions, the role changed repeatedly over the course of the experiment. 
Following Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) and others, we assumed that varied mapping con-
ditions would demand more capacity than the consistent mapping conditions, and so should 
produce larger violations of context independence. That is what we found.
These selective stopping results are interesting in contrast with simple stopping, where 
increasing the capacity demands of the go process has no effect on the stop process 
(see  above). We propose that this is due to the low selection demands in standard stop‐
signal tasks. This does not imply that capacity sharing can never occur in these tasks. 
The   stop rate parameters depend on the discriminability, intensity, and modality of the 
stop signal (e.g., van der Schoot, Licht, Horsley, & Sergeant, 2005), which could be inter-
preted as a capacity limitation (Logan et al., 2014). Furthermore, the influence of visual 
distractors on stopping (see above) is consistent with the idea that stimuli compete for 
limited processing capacity (Bundesen, 1990; Duncan, 2006). Finally, SSRT is prolonged 
on incongruent trials in interference control tasks (e.g., Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2004). This ‘functional dependence’ could also be interpreted as a 
capacity limitation. Thus, it seems that under certain circumstances, capacity sharing may 
occur in simple stop‐signal tasks.
Short SSDs Bissett (2014) looked for violations of context independence in simple stop‐
signal tasks, and found strong violations at SSDs shorter than 250 ms in almost every 
experiment he analysed. These violations were unexpected from the stop‐signal literature, 
where the independent race model has reigned supreme since the 1980s, but they would be 
expected from the dual‐task literature (see above). These violations may not have been 
apparent in published stop‐signal studies. Many studies now use a tracking procedure that 
adjusts SSDs to produce successful inhibition on 50% of the trials. This procedure usually 
produces a bell‐shaped distribution of SSDs with a mode well away from the short SSDs 
where context independence is violated. Moreover, researchers rarely report performance as 
a function of SSD. Instead, they often collapse across SSD, masking possible violations at 
short SSDs. Researchers should not try to avoid violations of context independence by 
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excluding short SSDs from their experiments. Subjects are sensitive to the range of SSDs and 
routinely slow their go task performance when SSDs are long (Logan, 1981). Instead, we 
suggest that investigators use a broad range of SSDs (e.g., by using the tracking procedure) 
and then remove the data from SSDs shorter than 200 ms before calculating SSRT. At 
 present, these recommendations are only provisional. More research needs to be done 
before we can make stronger recommendations.
Balancing Cognitive Demands
Proactive Control
In response‐inhibition tasks, people often adjust their behaviour in anticipation of future 
acts of inhibitory control (proactive inhibitory control). Proactive adjustments are made at 
the beginning of a block or on a trial‐by‐trial basis, suggesting a flexible cognitive system 
that adjusts itself quickly in response to novel contextual information (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009b). Proactive inhibitory control has received much attention in the cognitive 
neuroscience literature (for reviews, see Aron, 2011; Stuphorn & Emeric, 2012), and 
researchers have explored to what extent individual differences and developmental trends 
could reflect differences in the deployment of proactive control (e.g., Chevalier, Kelsey, 
Wiebe, & Espy, 2014). Here we will primarily focus on studies examining which control 
adjustments are made.
Proactive Adjustments of Attentional and Response Settings People adjust response settings 
when they anticipate a stop signal. In a series of experiments, we presented cues indicating 
whether signals were relevant for the next trial(s). We hypothesised that subjects balance 
going quickly and stopping by adjusting response thresholds in the go task (see above). 
Increasing the response threshold increases the finishing time of the go process, but 
decreases both the probability of an incorrect go response on no‐stop‐signal trials and the 
probability of a response on stop‐signal trials. Our behavioural results and subsequent dif-
fusion model fits supported the response‐threshold account (Logan et al., 2014; Verbruggen 
& Logan, 2009b).
Further studies suggest that proactive inhibitory control can also directly modulate 
motor activity (e.g., Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Lo, Boucher, 
Paré, Schall, & Wang, 2009). For example, Lo et al. (2009) observed high tonic activation 
of fixation neurons before the onset of a stop signal in a countermanding task, and argued 
that this was activation modulated by a top‐down proactive control signal. Suppression of 
prestimulus motor activity is also observed in go/no‐go and choice RT paradigms, which 
points to a general proactive control mechanism that prevents premature responding 
(Frank, 2006).
Most studies have focused on preparatory adjustments of response‐ or motor‐related 
processes. However, in some tasks, perceptual or attentional settings are also adjusted when 
subjects anticipate stop signals. The distractor study mentioned above contrasted no‐stop‐
signal blocks with stop‐signal blocks in which visual stop signals were presented in the 
centre of the screen and blocks in which the signals could occur in the periphery 
(Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). On half of the no‐stop‐signal trials in each block type, 
perceptual distractors were presented throughout the trial. These distractors had the largest 
effect on go responses in the noncentral signal blocks compared with central‐signal blocks 
and no‐stop‐signal blocks, suggesting that subjects widened their attentional focus for 
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detecting the signal in the periphery, making them more vulnerable to the distractors on 
no‐stop‐signal trials. Another study measured event‐related potentials in the go task 
(Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016). Both early and late go‐ERP compo-
nents were modulated when subjects expected a stop signal to occur. Thus, proactive inhib-
itory control involves adjusting the settings of both perceptual and response processes to 
balance the competing demands of the go and stop tasks (Elchlepp et al., 2016). Importantly, 
similar modulations of ERP components are observed in non‐inhibitory tasks, suggesting 
similarities between various forms of proactive control (Braver, 2012; Chapter 9 by Chiew & 
Braver in this volume).
Influences of Proactive Control on Stopping Proactive control does not necessarily influence 
SSRT (Logan & Burkell, 1986; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). Whether or not SSRT is 
influenced may depend on how proactive control adjustments are implemented (e.g., 
response slowing vs. enhanced monitoring; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). Proactive inhibitory 
control can also influence how people stop their responses. Brain stimulation studies sug-
gest that both task‐relevant and irrelevant muscles are suppressed on stop‐signal trials, 
indicating that stopping has global effects on the motor system (Aron, 2011). However, 
stopping becomes more selective when it can be prepared in advance (e.g., Aron & 
Verbruggen, 2008; Smittenaar, Guitart‐Masip, Lutti, & Dolan, 2013).
Proactive control could even lead to a ‘prepared control reflex’ (Verbruggen, Best, 
Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). When attention 
is proactively allocated and responses are prepared, goal‐directed behaviour may not require 
much control anymore (see also Chapter 7 by Hommel in this volume); instead, responses 
could be activated easily by stimuli in the environment (for a recent review, see Meiran, Cole, & 
Braver, 2012). Response inhibition can be triggered by task‐irrelevant primes (e.g., van 
Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a), 
but these priming effects are only observed in contexts in which subjects are instructed to 
stop occasionally (Chiu & Aron, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). These findings are 
consistent with the prepared reflex idea: once subjects have proactively adjusted attentional 
and response settings, the ‘stop response’ can be activated easily by both task‐relevant and 
task‐irrelevant information in the environment. Note that the ‘prepared reflex idea’ might 
also explain why going and stopping do not share (much) capacity in standard stop‐signal 
tasks (see above).
Post‐Signal Slowing
The proactive control literature indicates that people set detection and response criteria at the 
beginning of a trial or run of trials. These criteria are further adjusted after each trial. Response 
latencies are often slower after stop‐signal trials than after no‐stop‐signal trials (Bissett & 
Logan, 2011, 2012; Emeric et al., 2007; Nelson, Boucher, Logan, Palmeri, & Schall, 2010; 
Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2008). Bissett and Logan (2011) contrasted several accounts of post‐stop‐
signal slowing, and found most support for a strategic adjustment account that proposes that 
stop‐signal presentation encourages subjects to shift priority from the go task to the stop task. 
Such a shift produces longer response latencies after a signal trial and can reduce SSRT 
(Bissett & Logan, 2012). However, the SSRT reduction is only observed when the stop‐
signal modality remains the same (Bissett & Logan, 2012). This could indicate that the post‐
signal strategic adjustments influence attentional settings. Alternatively, the modality 
specificity could indicate stop‐signal priming (see below).
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Contributions From Memory and Long‐Term  
After‐Effects of Stopping
Stimulus‐Specific Sequential Effects
The post‐signal slowing is usually more pronounced when the stimulus, stimulus category, or 
stimulus features of the previous trial are repeated (Bissett & Logan, 2011; Rieger & Gauggel, 
1999; Verbruggen, Logan, et al., 2008). We have attributed this stimulus‐specific slowing to 
the retrieval of stimulus–stop associations: a go stimulus becomes associated with a ‘stop’ rep-
resentation on a stop trial; when it is repeated on the next go trial, the stop representation is 
activated via associative retrieval, and this will suppress the go response (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008b; Verbruggen, Logan, et al., 2008). Activation of these stop representations has 
global effects on responding (Giesen & Rothermund, 2014), which suggests that they are 
general (‘stop responding’) rather than response‐specific (e.g., ‘stop the left response’).
Associative Learning and Automatic Inhibition
The stimulus‐specific stop effects are observed up to 20 trials after the presentation of the 
stop signal (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). Such long‐term associations may support the 
development of automatic response inhibition (Logan, 1988, 1990). In a series of experi-
ments, we trained subjects to stop their response to a specific stimulus, and then reversed the 
stimulus–stop mappings in a test phase. In this test phase, subjects were slower to respond to 
stimuli previously associated with stopping compared with stimuli that they had not seen 
before or stimuli that were inconsistently associated with going and stopping (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008a). On the basis of this finding, we proposed the ‘automatic inhibition’ hypo-
thesis: inhibitory control in go/no‐go and stop‐signal tasks can be triggered automatically via 
the retrieval of stimulus–stop associations from memory.
Subsequent work indicated that different associations can be learned. For example, subjects 
can learn stimulus‐signal associations rather than stimulus–stop associations (Verbruggen, 
Best, et al., 2014). Such associations between the stop items and the stop signal will prime the 
representation of the stop‐signal detection rather than the stop goal or stop response. As dis-
cussed above, signal detection plays a critical role in successful stopping. Thus, by priming the 
representation of the stop signal, learning could lead to improvements in stopping performance 
without influencing responding on go trials. The signal learning idea can also account for the 
modality specificity of post‐stop signal improvements in SSRT (see above).
Stopping responses to stimuli can also lead to devaluation of these stimuli and reduce their 
behavioural incentive (e.g., Kiss, Raymond, Westoby, Nobre, & Eimer, 2008; Wessel, 
O’Doherty, Berkebile, Linderman, & Aron, 2014). Research on Pavlovian conditioning sug-
gests links between an aversive system and avoidance behaviour (withdrawal, suppression) 
and between an appetitive system and approach behaviour (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). 
Thus, when subjects have to stop their response to a specific stimulus, a link between this 
stimulus and the aversive/avoidance system may be created, impacting their motivational 
value. To account for these findings, McLaren and Verbruggen (2016) and Verbruggen, 
Best, et al. (2014) proposed an associative stop system that combines elements of associative 
learning theories, the interactive race model, and a Pavlovian model of motivational 
systems.
In sum, associative learning plays an important role in response‐inhibition tasks. It is 
important to note that the expression of stimulus‐specific training effects strongly depends on 
attentional settings (Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren, & Verbruggen, 2016). After learning, 
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subjects also form expectations about the occurrence of a stop signal, which influences 
subsequent performance. These findings suggest a strong interplay between learning and 
‘top‐down’ control processes (Best et al., 2016).
Applications of Automatic Inhibition
Automatic inhibition can have general effects on behaviour. For example, consistent pairing 
of food‐related pictures to stopping in a go/no‐go or stop‐signal paradigm reduces 
subsequent food consumption (e.g., Houben & Jansen, 2011; Lawrence, Verbruggen, 
Morrison, Adams, & Chambers, 2015), and may even lead to weight loss (Lawrence 
et al., 2015; Veling, van Koningsbruggen, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2014). Recent meta-analyses 
 indicate that no‐go/stop training has small but robust effects on food and alcohol consump-
tion (Allom, Mullan, & Hagger, 2015; Jones et al., 2016). Go/no‐go training may have 
larger effects on subsequent appetitive behaviour than stop‐signal training. Go/no‐go tasks 
often use a more consistent stimulus–stop pairing, and the probability of responding is usu-
ally lower than in stop‐signal tasks, which could influence the strength of stimulus–stop 
associations (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, 2008b).
The stimulus‐specific stop training opens promising new avenues for treatment. However, 
more work is required to determine how the training protocols can be optimised to pro-
duce large and long‐lasting effects. This will also require a careful study of the underlying 
mechanisms and a better understanding of how task characteristics influence what is 
learned.
General Learning and Carry‐Over Effects
Some studies have also explored whether people can generally learn to stop their responses 
and whether practice effects can transfer to other domains. The results are mixed. Some 
studies found that SSRT decreased over practice (e.g., Berkman, Kahn, & Merchant, 2014; 
Chevalier, Chatham, & Munakata, 2014; Logan & Burkell, 1986), whereas others failed to 
find such an SSRT decrease (e.g., Enge et al., 2014) General stop‐signal task training may 
induce a shift from reactive to proactive control (Berkman et al., 2014; Chevalier, Chatham, 
et al., 2014). This idea could help to reconcile the inconsistent training results, as not all 
forms of proactive control lead to SSRT improvements (see above).
General stop training and encouraging people to be cautious in stop‐signal blocks can 
reduce risk taking in gambling tasks (Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 
2012) and alcohol‐seeking behaviour (Jones, Cole, Goudie, & Field, 2011). However, 
these effects are small and short‐lived (Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen et al., 2013), which 
could potentially explain why some studies failed to observe far‐transfer effects (e.g., Enge 
et al., 2014).
Conclusions
In the past two decades, we have seen an exponential increase in the number of studies exam-
ining the neurocognitive processes underlying response inhibition and correlations with 
behaviours outside the lab (Verbruggen, Chambers, et  al., 2013). This work has led to 
detailed accounts of reactive inhibitory control (Logan et al., 2014). More recently, several 
studies have also shown how people adjust settings of lower‐level perceptual and response 
systems to find a balance between going quickly and stopping in response to changes in the 
environment or internal state. Evidence that learning plays a critical role when stopping a 
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response has challenged theory and opened up an exciting new literature on the training and 
transfer of response inhibition. Above all, the work reviewed in this chapter highlights again 
that stopping or withholding a response relies on an interplay between many processes that 
take place on different time scales.
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